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COBELL SETTLEMENT FINALIZED AFTER YEARS OF 




In late November 2012, the Cobell settlement was finalized after more 
than seventeen years of litigation.1  Finally, after countless decades of the 
federal government mismanaging Native American trust accounts, the 
United States would pay more than $3.4 billion to thousands of Native 
Americans holding trust accounts.2  In reference to the settlement, President 
Obama stated, “I welcome the final approval of the Cobell settlement 
agreement, clearing the way for reconciliation between the trust 
beneficiaries and the federal government."3  But is the Cobell settlement 
really a victory for trust beneficiaries?  Or is the settlement an unfair “quick 
fix” that once again demonstrates the failure of the United States to fulfill 
its fiduciary duty4 as a trustee?   
The United States has held land in trust for Native Americans since the 
Dawes Act of 1887.5  As a trustee, the government owes a fiduciary duty to 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Maryann Batlle, Historic $3.4 Billion Cobell Settlement Final, Clearing Way for 
Tribal Payments, CRONKITE NEWS (Nov. 27, 2012), http://cronkitenewsonline.com/2012/ 
11/historic-3-4-billion-cobell-settlement-final-clearing-way-for-tribal-payments/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of the 
President on the Final Approval of the Cobell Settlement (Nov. 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/26/statement-president-final-approval-
cobell-settlement. 
 4. For analysis on the fiduciary relationship established under two important tribal trust 
cases, see Daniel W. Hart, Note, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation: Why the Supreme 
Court’s Refusal to Apply the Fiduciary Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege Stands to 
Diminish the Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527, 531-34 (2011-
2012).  
 5. Jered T. Davidson, Comment, This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land? Why 
the Cobell Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian Land Fractionation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
575, 580 (2010-2011). 
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properly maintain all trust accounts.6  However, the United States has 
struggled to properly maintain tribal trust accounts because of the vast 
amount of land held in trust, numerous transfers of ownership, and the 
development of fractional7 interests over time.8  As an attempt to fix the 
fractionalization and trust mismanagement problems, Congress enacted the 
American Indian Trust Management Act of 1994 (“the 1994 Act”), which 
required the Secretary of State to make a full accounting to each trust 
account holder annually.9  Eloise Cobell, among other named plaintiffs, 
filed a class action lawsuit against the Secretary for failure to provide a full 
accounting to each account holder on an annual basis as required by the 
1994 Act.10  After years of litigation, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement, which Congress later approved.11  The settlement agreement 
resulted in a total award of $3.412 billion.12   
Proponents of the settlement agreement claimed it as a “victory” for 
individual trust holders.13  In stark contrast, opponents of the settlement saw 
it as another failed attempt to properly compensate Native American trust 
account holders.14  For instance, despite the 1994 Act requiring a full 
accounting to each individual account holder, the Secretary of State refused 
to do so because of the expense.15  Instead of fulfilling its fiduciary duty 
and doing a full accounting to arrive at the correct amount owed to tribes, 
the government decided that $3.4 billion was sufficient.16 According to at 
least one estimate, however, the true amount owed to trust account holders 
is “between ten and forty billion dollars.”17  Critics also pointed out the 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. at 579; Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing “the 
fiduciary relationship owed Indian tribes as the highest of moral obligations”).   
 7. For a discussion on fractionation, see Kristina L. McCulley, Comment, The 
American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004: The Death of Fractionation or Individual 
Native American Property Interests and Tribal Customs?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 401, 407-
13 (2005-2006). 
 8. See generally Davidson, supra note 5. 
 9. 25 U.S.C. § 4021 (2012). 
 10. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2012).   
 11. Id. at 913-15. 
 12. Id. at 916.   
 13. See Batlle, supra note 1.  
 14. S.E. Ruckman, ‘Cobell Warming’, NATIVE AM. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www. 
nativetimes.com/life/commentary/6035-se-ruckman-cobell-warming. 
 15. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d at 914. 
 16. Id. at 916. 
 17. Christopher Barrett Bowman, Comment, Indian Trust Fund: Resolution and 
Proposed Reformation to the Mismanagement Problems Associated with the Individual 
Indian Money Accounts in Light of Cobell v. Norton, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 543, 543 (2004). 
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large attorney fees and incentive payments for the class representatives.18  
Ninety-nine million of this award went to the attorneys’ fees and $2.5 
million went to the four class representatives.19 
Kimberly Craven was one of the many critics that objected to the terms 
of the agreement.  Craven endured heavy criticism for her decision to 
appeal; attorneys for some of the Cobell plaintiffs went as far as posting an 
ethically questionable letter criticizing those who objected along with their 
contact information.20  But Craven was fighting for the same outcome as the 
original plaintiff, Cobell: a fair and just settlement.  This note will analyze 
the issues Craven raised in her appeal.  One issue in this case is whether 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) allows class certification, 
despite possible interclass conflict.  The second issue is whether incentive 
payments to class representatives are proper, and at what point does the 
payment amount create a conflict between the class representative and 
unnamed class members.   
Part II of this note will discuss a brief history of the 1994 Act and the 
history preceding Craven’s appeal.  Part III will discuss Craven’s two main 
arguments against the settlement.  Part IV describes why the appeals court 
misapplied Rule 23.  Additionally, this note suggests that the district court 
or the United States Supreme Court should have adopted a proportionality 
method to determine whether incentive payments to class representatives 
create an interclass conflict.  Since the Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed whether incentive payments should be allowed in class actions, 
this note suggests that the Supreme Court should allow incentive payments, 
but have lower courts consider the fairness of such awards based on 
proportionality principles.   
II. Law Before the Case 
A. American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994 
Congress enacted the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform 
Act in 1994 (“the 1994 Act”).21  The 1994 Act was touted as the solution to 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Craven v. Cobell, 133 S. Ct. 543 (2012) (No. 
12-234), 2012 WL 3613470 at *6-*7.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Rob Capriccioso, A Public Letter from the Cobell Lawyers Prompts Ethics and 
Harassment Concerns, NATIVE STRENGTH (Jan. 30, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://nativestrength. 
com/2012/01/30/a-public-letter-from-the-cobell-lawyers-prompts-ethics-and-harassment-
concerns/. 
 21. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2012).   
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a century of failed attempts to properly manage trust accounts.22  The 
purpose of the 1994 Act was to reaffirm the fiduciary duty owed to trust 
account holders and allow both tribes and individual trust holders to make 
more decisions involving their accounts.23  Section 4011 of the 1994 Act 
recognized the need to properly manage accounts held in trust and required 
the Secretary of Interior to account for the daily and annual balances of 
each account.24  Each account holder was to receive annual statements of 
the current and past balances of the account, information concerning any 
changes from gains or losses, and all receipts.25  Additionally, the Secretary 
had to provide quarterly statements for accounts that were active within the 
past eighteen months and had balances greater than one dollar.26  Section 
4012 granted individual account holders the right to demand interest 
payments relating back to the date when the Secretary first started investing 
money from individual Indian accounts.27  In order to be entitled to these 
payments, the individual holders had to be identified in the account or the 
individual would have to provide sufficient documentation proving their 
right to recover.28  
The 1994 Act also established the Office of the Special Trustee for 
American Indians.29  The Special Trustee had the task of formulating plans 
to better manage trust accounts.30  The Special Trustee developed a plan, 
but lacked adequate funding for implementation.31  No one sought funding 
for the new plan and a few years later, the Cobell class action began.32 
B. Cobell v. Salazar 
As a result of the government’s non-compliance with the 1994 Act, 
Eloise Cobell and four additional plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in 1996 against 
the Secretary of Interior for mismanagement of their trust accounts.33  The 
plaintiffs sought a historical accounting of the trust accounts pursuant to the 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Bowman, supra note 17, at 553. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 25 U.S.C. § 4011 (2012). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. § 4012. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. § 4041. 
 30. Id. § 4043(a)(1). 
 31. Bowman, supra note 17, at 556. 
 32. Id. at 556-57. 
 33. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2012).   
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1994 Act.34  However, the 1994 Act did not specify how to manage the 
historical accounting.35  While the Secretary gave Congress an estimated 
cost of $2.4 billion for the accounting, Congress was only willing to pay 
$127.1 million.36  Consequently, the Secretary created a new plan in 2007 
based on statistical sampling that would cost significantly less, $271 
million.37  This plan eliminated the individual accounting requirement of 
the Act.38   
In 2009, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.39  There were 
two separate classes, the Historical Accounting Class (“HAC”) and the 
Trust Administration Class (“TAC”).40  The HAC was composed of class 
members that held Individual Indian Money (“IIM”)41 accounts during the 
period of October 25, 1994 to September 30, 2009.42  The TAC trust 
holders with IMM accounts from 1985 and individuals with proof that they 
had some right to land held in trust.43   
The members of the HAC would receive $1000 each and were certified 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), which gives members no option to opt out.44  The 
court certified the HAC under 23(b)(1)(A), which states that a class action 
may be appropriate when separate actions risk “inconsistent or varying 
adjunctions with respect to individual class members that would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”45  
Given the size of the class, separate proceedings would be difficult and the 
amount of litigation costs would be massive.  However, before any class 
can be certified, the court must check to see if all the prerequisites of Rule 
23(a) are met: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 913-14. 
 38. Id. at 914.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. For a discussion on the mismanagement and fractionation of IIM accounts, see 
James T. Hamilton, Progressing Back: A Tribal Solution for a Federal Morass, 27 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 375, 378-80 (2002-2003). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
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impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.46 
The class was alternatively certified under 23(b)(2), which provides that 
“the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that 
apply generally to the class, so that final injunction relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”47 
The members of the TAC would each receive at least $500 and a “pro 
rata share of the remaining settlement funds in accordance with an agreed-
upon compensation formula.”48  Additionally, “reasonable attorney fees” 
and “incentive payments for the class representatives” were included in the 
settlement agreement.49  The TAC was given the right to opt out; however, 
many class members did not realize that they had waived their right to opt 
out when they signed the settlement agreement.50  Congress approved the 
settlement in 2010 and increased the amount of money for the TAC to 
$800.51  Congress did this “without regard to the requirements of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and provided that such a certification 
would be treated as a certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).”52  On 
December 21, 2010, the district court approved the settlement and certified 
both classes.53  
III. Statement of the Case 
Kimberly Craven, along with ninety-one other class members, objected 
to the settlement, and a hearing was held on June 20, 2011.54  Craven 
argued first, that the settlement went against the “law of the case.”55  
Second, Craven argued the settlement agreement lacked an opt-out 
provision for the HAC.56  Third, Craven argued that a possible intra-class 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. Rule 23(a). 
 47. Id. Rule 23(b)(2). 
 48. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2012).   
 49. Id. at 915. 
 50. Id. at 914.  
 51. Id. at 915. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 916. 
 56. Id. at 917. 
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conflict among the class representatives and other members existed because 
of the size of the incentive payments in comparison to the awards of other 
class members.57  The district court rejected all of these arguments and 
Craven appealed.58   
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Craven’s first argument by 
stating that “[u]nder the law-of-the-case doctrine, ‘the same issue presented 
a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same 
result,’” and did not apply in this situation.59  Although it was the same case 
in the same court, the circumstances had changed.60  When the court first 
addressed the issue, the Secretary was still considering a full accounting to 
each account holder.61  But now, it was not possible to complete a full 
accounting because Congress failed to provide the funds necessary.62  
Additionally, the groups were not subdivided into two separate classes in 
the earlier decision.63  
Craven’s second argument against class certification was that the $1000 
settlement payment to each class member in the HAC was individualized 
monetary relief.64  As a result, it went against the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.65  In that case, the Supreme Court denied 
class certification of female employees that claimed the managers 
discriminated against them based on their gender.66  The lower court 
certified the class under 23(b)(2).67  The Supreme Court hinted that this rule 
could be read as applying only to injunctive or declaratory relief, and did 
not authorize class certification of monetary claims.68  However, this case 
was answered on the narrower issue — that claims for “individualized 
[monetary] relief” violated the rule.69  Since back pay to each individual 
employee was individualized, the Court refused to certify the class.70  The 
Court held that class certification under 23(b)(2) could not be granted 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 918. 
 58. Id. at 915. 
 59. Id. at 916-17. 
 60. Id. at 917. 
 61. Id. at 913. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 917. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (citing Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557-58 (2011)). 
 66. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 67. Id. at 2548-49. 
 68. Id. at 2557 (citing Ticor Tittle Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2561. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
636 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
 
 
“where the monetary relief is not incidental to the requested injunctive or 
declaratory relief.”71 
In the current case, the court of appeals denied that the settlement was 
individualized because the Secretary’s refusal to conduct historical 
accounting made it impossible to determine what each individual’s actual 
claim would be worth.72  The court stated, even if it was assumed “that the 
$1,000 per capita settlement payment monetized the requested injunctive 
relief, certification of the HAC as a Rule 23(b)(2) class was nonetheless 
appropriate because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the 
litigation.”73  The court further reasoned that even if the payments 
monetized the injunctive relief, the unique circumstances and complications 
made it appropriate.74  The court emphasized the years spent in litigation 
and the importance of congressional approval of the settlement.75   
As to Craven’s third objection, the court of appeals denied there was an 
intra-class conflict.76 Craven claimed that two separate classes were 
insufficient to protect absent members because some claims are worth more 
than others.  The appellate court acknowledged that congressional hearings 
did contain testimony that some claims may be worth more if they held 
royalties for oil and gas held in trust by the United States.77  However, the 
court of appeals stated that most royalty owners exchanged their interest for 
a lump sum payment in 1919.78  The court further stated that even if class 
members still held interest in oil and gas royalties, they were part of the 
TAC and had a right to opt out.79   
Craven had also argued “that, prior to the settlement agreement, the class 
representatives received historical accounting that showed their trust claims 
to be of little value; the[ir] interests therefore were in conflict with those of 
the rest of the classes that did not know how they would fare under the 
distribution scheme.”80  The court found that the named class 
representatives did not receive a full accounting of their claim.81  As a 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 73. Id. at 918. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 920. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 921. 
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result, there was no proof of over-compensation.82  The court further stated 
that even if the class representatives were over-compensated, Craven could 
not prove that other members of the class were under compensated.83  The 
court of appeals rejected all of Craven’s claims and affirmed the 
settlement.84 
IV. Analysis 
A. The D.C. Circuit Court Improperly Placed the Burden on Craven to 
Show an Interclass Conflict   
Craven petitioned the United States Supreme Court on August 2, 2012; 
however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 29, 2012.85  By 
denying certiorari, the Court has left unresolved two important issues raised 
by Craven in her appeal:86 (1) whether the court of appeals improperly put 
the burden on her to show proof of an impermissible structural conflict in 
order for the Court to deny class certification;87 and (2) whether the large 
incentive payments to the class representatives adversely affected their 
ability to fairly represent other class members.88  
As to the first issue, Craven argued that the prerequisites of Rule 23 
made it the class representatives’ burden to show that certification was 
proper.89 She argued that it was impossible for her to meet this burden 
because the Secretary of Interior was the only one who had access to the 
information, some of which was destroyed.90  Craven claimed the court of 
appeals improperly put the burden on her to prove that other class members 
were inadequately represented when Rule 23 clearly states it is the 
plaintiff’s burden to show adequate representation.91   
The United States Supreme Court stated in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes that Rule 23 is more than a “mere pleading standard,” and those 
attempting to certify the class “must affirmatively demonstrate his 
compliance with the Rule — that is, he must be prepared to prove that there 
are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 924. 
 85. Craven v. Cobell, 133 S. Ct. 543 (2012) (No. 12-234). 
 86. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at i-ii. 
 87. Id. at 17. 
 88. Id. at 22. 
 89. Id. at 17. 
 90. Id. at 19. 
 91. Id. at 17. 
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etc.”92  Craven claimed that the court of appeals went against the Supreme 
Court’s instruction by not making it the plaintiff’s burden to show these 
requirements.93  
Craven additionally argued in her petition to the Supreme Court that the 
District of Columbia created a circuit split as to what must be shown to 
establish an intra-class conflict.94  Craven claimed the circuit courts are split 
on the issue of whether potential conflicts are enough to deny class 
certification.95  Craven admitted that most courts require more than 
speculative proof; but several courts disagree on how proof should be 
defined.96  The Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have described 
potential conflicts resulting from “structural flaw[s] or ‘potential’ issue[s] 
[as] enough to raise serious questions’ warranting denial of certification.”97  
In contrast, the Fourth, Ninth, and now, the District of Columbia Circuits 
require more than “speculative proof for a conflict to exist.”98  These courts 
require “hard evidence” of an actual conflict.99  However, the Fourth Circuit 
only requires a potential intra-class conflict for mandatory classes.100  
Circuit splits cause results to vary from court to court, which leads to 
unpredictability and may adversely affect claimants’ rights.  This circuit 
split is especially significant because in cases such as this one, an objecting 
class member will never be able to show an actual intra-class conflict when 
they have no way to access the records.  
The attorneys for the class action claimed there was no conflict between 
the circuits because the different outcomes in these cases were based on 
factual differences, and not applying different standards.101  They argued 
that the lower courts in all the cases cited by Craven were properly using 
the standards established by the Supreme Court in Amchem Products Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Walmart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 18. 
 94. Id. at 15. 
 95. Id. at 15-16. 
 96. Id. at 16. 
 97. Id. (citing In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.2d 242 
(2d. Cir. 2011)); see also Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
 98. Id. (citing Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012).  
 99. Id. (citing Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 100. Id. (citing Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338 
(4th Cir. 1998)). 
 101. Brief in Opposition of Plaintiffs-Respondents at 13, Craven v. Cobell, 133 S. Ct. 
543 (2012) (No. 12-234), 2012 WL 4426427, at *13. 
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Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.102  Craven also cited these two 
cases in support of her argument.103 
Both Amchem and Ortiz involved class actions for asbestos exposure.104 
Amchem contained members that were suffering health related issues from 
asbestos exposure and members that were exposed but had not yet 
experienced health problems.105  Nine class representatives were named for 
the entire class.106  The Court stated that those already suffering health 
problems had the incentive to reach a large, quick settlement.107  In contrast, 
members that were only exposed, but not yet ill, did not know what claims 
they may have in the future.108  Thus, the Court denied class certification 
because the class lacked structural safeguards to protect separate interests, 
such as subgroups with class representatives for each.109 
Amchem provides support for both Craven and the plaintiffs’ attorneys.  
The case supports those opposing Craven because the Court in Amchem 
emphasized the need for Congress to authorize a large settlement, which did 
occur in the Cobell case.110  Also, the class members were divided into two 
separate subclasses, the TAC and the HAC.111  On the other hand, Amchem 
also supports Craven’s argument because some evidence did exist that the 
TAC contained both low value claims and high value.112  According to the 
government’s own evidence, most claims were of low value.113  As 
evidence of high value claims, Craven cites to a lawsuit pending in federal 
court, Two Shields v. United States.114  However, the plaintiffs claim that 
Two Shields involves a different claim, mismanagement of land by leasing 
to oil companies for under market value.115   
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id.  
 103. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 15. 
 104. See generally Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).   
 105. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 603. 
 106. Id. at 602-03. 
 107. Id. at 626. 
 108. Id. at 628. 
 109. Id. at 626. 
 110. See Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064. 
 111. See Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 914 (D.C. Cir 2012). 
 112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 12. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Brief in Opposition of Plaintiffs-Respondents, supra  note 101, at 20. 
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Ortiz was also an asbestos class action concerning a different issue of 
class certification.116  In this case, the class action included members that 
had not filed lawsuits over asbestos exposure, but excluded individuals that 
had settled with the company and retained the right to sue later if they 
subsequently suffered from health related problems.117  The Court found the 
settlement unfair because a large number of claimants could be excluded.118  
Further, the Court found that the payments to the class representatives were 
unfair because they would receive double the average amount immediately, 
as well as a portion of the leftover funds.119 
B. Incentive Payments to Class Representatives Were Vastly 
Disproportionate to Others’ Awards  
The second issue Craven appealed to the Supreme Court concerned the 
class representatives’ large incentive payments.120  The size of incentive 
awards class representatives receive must be carefully scrutinized to ensure 
they comply with the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(4).121  This rule requires 
the class representative to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”122  The Supreme Court has not set guidelines for determining the 
appropriate size of incentive awards.123  Instead, courts may use their 
discretion or follow the jurisdiction’s procedures for incentive awards.124  
This practice creates unpredictability for claimants and may encourage 
forum shopping.125  By denying certiorari in this case, the Supreme Court 
missed an invaluable opportunity to set guidelines for incentive payments in 
class actions.   
The class representatives received incentive payments drastically higher 
than the average payments to the unnamed class members.  The first named 
plaintiff, Cobell, received $2 million, a second representative received 
$200,000, and the last two class representatives were each awarded 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 117. Id. at 854. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 121. Ann K. Wooster, Propriety of Incentive Awards or Incentive Agreements in Class 
Actions, 60 A.L.R. 6th 295, § 25 (2010). 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 123. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 7 (citing London v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 124. Id. 
 125. For a discussion on forum shopping, see generally Note, Forum Shopping 
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677 1990). 
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$150,000.126  In stark contrast, the HAC members only received $1000 
each, and the TAC members only received approximately $800 each.127  
The incentive payments were immensely higher than those normally 
allowed in class actions, where the median amount for a class representative 
is approximately $4000.128  However, since the Supreme Court has not set 
any guidelines for courts to follow, the Cobell court was free to use its 
discretion and approved the incentive awards.  
Incentive awards can be beneficial and should not be prohibited; but 
objective guidelines are needed to promote uniformity and fairness in class 
actions.  For example, incentive awards are beneficial in class actions 
where the recovery for each individual class member may be nominal; 
otherwise, it would be difficult to find a class representative to bring the 
class action.129  Also, incentive awards may be appropriate in situations 
where the class representative has financially contributed or spent a 
substantial amount of time or effort for the benefit of the class action.130   
On the other hand, a disproportionate incentive award to class 
representatives creates conflicts of interest with other class members.131  A 
class representative owes a fiduciary duty to other class members.132  If the 
incentive award is too large, the class representative may be tempted to act 
in their own best interest instead of acting in the best interest of all class 
members.133  As a result, these two competing interests must be balanced.  
There are a number of methods to balance these interests; but creating a 
clear set of guidelines for all courts to follow is crucial. 
Comparing the Cobell settlement to another similar class action 
illustrates the need to have uniform, objective guidelines.  The most 
significant difference between the Cobell court and the court in Van 
Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Company is the use of the following factors, 
which determine whether the incentive payment to the class representative 
was appropriate:   
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1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both 
financial and otherwise; 2) the notoriety and personal difficulties 
encountered by the class representative; 3) the amount of time 
and effort spent by the class representative; 4) the duration of the 
litigation and; 5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed 
by the class representative as a result of the litigation.134   
In Van Vranken, the named representative was to receive $100,000 as an 
incentive payment out of a nearly $70 million settlement.135  The court 
found that the representative had spent substantial time on the case over 
several years of litigation, beginning in 1979 and ending in 1995.136  
Additionally, the class representative was a key witness in the case, and 
contributed financially on several occasions.137  However, the court found 
that his claim was not substantially worth more than other class members 
and lowered the incentive award to $50,000.138 
Similar to the Van Vranken case, the attorneys for the Cobell class action 
claimed that the incentive awards for the named class representatives were 
justified because of the length of the litigation and the amount of 
participation.139  For example, the named class representative, Cobell, spent 
approximately $390,000 over a twenty-year period, and traveled across the 
United States to further support the class action.140  Cobell died shortly after 
the approval of the settlement and was recognized by a number of groups 
for her efforts.141  Attorneys for the Cobell class action also claimed the 
other named class representatives were more involved than those in a 
typical class action.142 
Unlike the court in Van Vranken, the court in the Cobell settlement did 
not apply a set of factors to determine whether the incentive awards were 
appropriate.143  Instead, the court made general findings such as the one 
cited above by the Cobell attorneys to justify the awards.144  If the court of 
appeals had applied the Van Vranken factors, the incentive payments most 
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likely would not have been approved.  The Cobell litigation did last for 
several years, but not many more than the Van Vranken case.145  
Additionally, at least one named representative contributed a substantial 
amount of money and time for the benefit of the Cobell class action.146   
But the other Cobell class representatives did not contribute as 
substantially and still were given very generous payments.147  Arguably, 
three of the four class representatives in the Cobell settlement contributed 
the same amount as the class representative in Van Vranken, if not 
considerably less.148  In Van Vranken, the class representative presented key 
testimony to weaken the other party’s defense.149  Like the Van Vranken 
case, class representatives in the Cobell settlement did not have substantial 
claims.150  According to some of the evidence in the case, a partial 
accounting of the class representatives’ claims proved they were not 
substantially large or different than most of the other claims.151  For these 
reasons, the Van Vranken court would probably have lowered all of the 
incentive awards in the Cobell class action as it did for the class 
representative in the Van Vranken case.  Comparing the Cobell settlement 
with the Van Vranken settlement demonstrates the disparities that occur 
when the Supreme Court fails to establish uniform guidelines to direct the 
lower courts.  
V. Proposed Guidelines for Determining Appropriate Incentive Payments  
The Supreme Court should adopt the Van Vranken factors as an objective 
guideline for courts to determine the appropriate amount for incentive 
payments.152  Prior to approving an incentive award in a settlement 
agreement, a court should apply the Van Vranken factors.153  Once an 
amount is determined, the court should compare the amount each class 
representative would receive to the net settlement amount and to the award 
each class member would receive.  If either percentage appears excessive 
when compared to other class action incentive payments, the court should 
require proof to justify the disparity.  Without proper justification, the court 
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should lower the incentive payment to a more appropriate amount.  These 
guidelines would encourage the class representatives to be part of the 
litigation process, and would motivate them to get the best deal for all class 
members.   
Although the Supreme Court has not taken a position on incentive 
awards, lower courts have considered the proportionality of the 
representatives’ awards compared to the overall settlement.154  For example, 
a California district court held in Alberto v. GMRI, Inc. that the court must 
conduct a proportionality review in order to determine whether the 
incentive payments were too high.155  To make this determination, the court 
balanced “the number of named plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the 
proportion of the payments relative to the settlement amount, and the size 
of each payment.”156   
In Alberto, the named representative was to receive $5000 as an 
incentive award and the unnamed class members would receive 
approximately $25 each.157  The total settlement amount was $700,000158; 
making the incentive payments 0.71% of the total settlement amount.159  
The court considered this payment too high compared to other class action 
incentive payments that ranged from 0.17-0.56%.160  Thus, the court 
refused to approve the proposed incentive payment at the fairness hearing 
unless it could be justified by the representative’s effort or time spent on the 
case.161   
Comparing the incentive award to the overall settlement award creates an 
objective method to determine whether an incentive award is excessive. 
However, it does not incentivize the class representative to reach the best 
deal for each individual member.  In order to create this incentive, the 
awards should not exceed a certain percentage compared to the individual 
awards of each class member.  Courts should look at both standards to 
determine whether incentive payments are excessive.  Depending on the 
type of class action, one standard may be more appropriate than the other. 
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The Cobell settlement is a prime example of how a large overall 
settlement, over $3.412 billion, may make the incentive payments of $2.5 
million not excessive, compared to the Alberto case (cited previously).162  
The class representative receiving $2 million would only take 0.00059% of 
the net settlement, and the remaining representatives (totaling half a 
million) would receive an even smaller percentage.  However, when 
compared to the amount each individual member would receive, either 
$800 or $1000, the incentive payments are excessive.  
In Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., the court compared the class 
representative incentive award to the maximum recovery a non-
representative would receive.  In Murray, the court implied that a 
“sufficient disparity — where the representative recovered 300% of the 
maximum allowable recovery — might render a settlement ‘untenable.’”163  
In that case, the class representative had an incentive payment of $3000, 
and the maximum amount unnamed members could recover was $1.164 The 
Supreme Court should adopt a similar standard to determine whether an 
award is excessive (in addition to comparing the class representative’s 
award to the net settlement amount). 
In the Cobell settlement, the class representative receiving $2 million 
will earn 250,000% more than the TAC (approximately $800 each).  
Compared to the HAC, that same representative would receive 200,000% 
more than the average payment of $1000.  At some point, incentive awards 
become excessive and tempt the class representative to look out solely for 
their own interest.165 
By adopting the proposed standard, courts can ensure incentive awards 
do not create conflicts of interest.  Given the varying types of class actions, 
courts should compare incentive payments to both the total net settlement 
and the amount other members would receive.  If the incentive payments 
are excessive compared to other class action incentive payments, the 
representatives should be required to show evidence to justify the 
disparity.166 
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The Cobell case is unique due to the large number of class members, the 
years of litigation, and the inability to get a full accounting from the federal 
government to determine the true value of all claims.167  Given its 
complexities, as well as the involvement of Congress, the Supreme Court 
may have been hesitant to disturb the settlement agreement.  However, 
Craven raised two important issues that require action by the Supreme 
Court to lessen confusion in future cases.168   
As to the first issue, the court of appeals placed an impossible burden on 
Craven and other objectors to show an actual intra-class conflict.169  This is 
especially inappropriate considering it was the government’s fault records 
were destroyed and a full historical accounting was not conducted.170  Since 
the government has a fiduciary relationship with Indian trust account 
holders, there should be a full historical accounting even if the cost exceeds 
most claims.171  Arguably, this would be the cheaper choice since the 
government has stated that most of the accounts checked did not contain 
errors.172  Further, the government argues that most claims are of low value, 
so even if some account holders are owed money, the amount should be 
relatively low.173  
The second issue, concerning the appropriateness of large incentive 
payments to the class representatives, presented the United States Supreme 
Court with an opportunity to address whether these types of awards are 
appropriate as well as the proper amount.174  Like many class actions, the 
lawyers and class representatives seem to be the ones truly benefitting from 
the settlement.  The attorneys will receive $99 million and the class 
representatives will receive $2.5 million.175  In stark contrast, all other 
members will each receive either $800 or $1000.176   
Incentive payments may be appropriate to a certain extent, but at some 
point it would seem to create a conflict of interest between the class 
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representatives and the other class members.177  The incentive payments in 
this case were vastly larger than most class actions.178  Because the 
Supreme Court has not set guidelines, each court must decide on its own 
what is appropriate.  This may lead to forum shopping and more 
importantly, create incentives for class representatives to settle rather than 
try to get the best deal for the non-named class members.  Implementing the 
proposed standard would create uniformity for all courts, and ensure 
incentive awards do not create conflicts of interest.  However, since the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case, both issues raised by Craven 
remain unresolved.179 
Both of these issues are particularly troubling because of the unique 
relationship between the parties in this case.  Unlike most class actions, a 
fiduciary duty exists between the federal government and Native 
Americans.  An earlier decision in this case by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals clearly stated:  
The federal government has substantial trust responsibilities 
toward Native Americans. This is undeniable . . . It is equally 
clear that the federal government has failed time and again to 
discharge its fiduciary duties. Here, there is no dispute that 
appellants, as trustee-delegates of the federal government, have 
failed to discharge fully their fiduciary obligations.180  
Eleven years later, the same court emphasized what a major 
“accomplishment” it was to get the settlement approved.181  Instead of 
requiring a full historical accounting, the court further states that most 
accounts were likely not mismanaged.182  In other words, the class members 
are lucky to receive such a generous settlement.  Since the settlement has 
been finalized, it has become one more example of how the government has 
failed to fulfill its trust obligations to Native Americans. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 177. See Wooster, supra note 121, § 10. 
 178. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 26 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2006)). 
 179. See Batlle, supra note 1. 
 180. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 181. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 916 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 182. Id. at 918. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
